Jobs

Location: University of Bordeaux, Pessac.

Contract duration: 15 months.

Preferred start date: 01/03/2026.

Mission overview :

The recruited person will focus on insurance and land arrangements in residential areas at risk.
The evolution of the climate is accompanied by an increase in claims and questions the evolution of our insurance system in these territories. If the increase in the natural disaster surcharge on January 1, 2025 (from 12% to 20%) allows for correcting the imbalance of the natural disaster compensation scheme in the short term, its resistance to climate change in the medium term requires working on other levers.
In a preventive logic, it would thus be advisable to encourage the adoption of individual protective behaviours, which the CatNat mechanism is struggling to induce (in the case of risks covered by CatNat).
This study is part of this perspective, and more particularly targets what concerns incentives to change individual behaviors.

The postdoctoral research will be able to address the following tasks and target those that will be addressed as a priority:

• Modeling of individual housing decisions.
• Design of a hybrid incentive between public solidarity and private financial insurance.

The specific study topics may evolve according to the skills of the post-doctoral student. e selected. and developments of research already underway. They a priori include the following elements:

• Risk preferences [Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics].
• Moral hazard (the risk associated with the implementation of a public collective insurance (CatNat) does not encourage avoiding risky localization) [Theory of Incentives].
• Residential location choices and real estate/land market [Urban economy].

Profile sought :

Holder of a PhD in in Economics, you have proven knowledge of theoretical modelling, incentive theory and decision theory under uncertainty, moral hazard and anti-selection as well as empirical studies, preference evaluation, choice experiments, discrete choice simulations.

Supervision :

You will work under the supervision of Mrs. Cécile AUBERT, Professor in economics Univ. Bordeaux – BxSE and Mrs. Jeanne DACHARY BERNARD Researcher in environmental economics, microeconomics and land economics INRAe – UR ETTIS.

Detailed job offer in english here and application before January 4 here.

Offre détaillée ici.

Le 16 juin 2023, un séisme de magnitude 4.8 à 4.9 a frappé la Charente-Maritime, entre les villages de La Laigne et de Cram-Chaban. Sa faible profondeur a engendré une forte intensité épicentrale, occasionnant des dégâts importants sur le bâti patrimonial local. Si plusieurs bâtiments ont ensuite été renforcés, les niveaux de performance visés par ces interventions ne sont pas toujours documentés — notamment en termes d'accélération de référence ou de niveau de sûreté atteint. Cette thèse propose de répondre à ces lacunes en développant une méthodologie rigoureuse de renforcement et de reconstruction post-sismique du bâti ancien.

Sujet de thèse

Le travail s'articulera autour de trois axes :

• En premier lieu, un inventaire systématique des dommages et des méthodes de renforcement déployées après le séisme de La Laigne sera réalisé, à partir des arrêtés de péril, des données recueillies auprès des bureaux d'études techniques et de l'association des sinistrés.
• Dans un second temps, les bâtiments les plus représentatifs identifiés serviront de base au développement d'un jumeau numérique : un modèle de bâtiment en maçonnerie permettant de reproduire les endommagements observés (fissures, inclinaisons, ruptures), en mobilisant des codes de calcul avancés tels que TREMURI, OPENSEES, 3DEC ou LMGC90. Le comportement des structures sera évalué à l'aide de courbes de capacité et d'analyses dynamiques sous séisme.
• Enfin, sur la base de ces modélisations, des méthodes de renforcement adaptées au bâti ancien seront proposées, en s'appuyant sur les normes EUROCODE 8 et en tenant compte des spécificités architecturales locales, en lien étroit avec le BRGM et le CAUE 17.

Encadrement

Olivier Millet et Rachid Cherif (LaSIE – UMR CNRS 7356, La Rochelle Université), et Caterina Negulescu (BRGM).

Profil recherché

Ingénieur·e ou titulaire d'un Master 2 en calcul des structures ou génie civil option structure, mécanique, matériaux, physique ou mathématiques appliquées. Des compétences en modélisation et calcul par éléments finis sont souhaitées.

Comment candidater ?

Date limite de candidature : 30 mai 2026.

Merci d'adresser votre dossier (CV, lettre de motivation, relevés de notes de Licence et de Master) aux contacts suivants :

olivier.millet@univ-lr.fr ;  rachid.cherif@univ-lr.fr ; C.Negulescu@brgm.fr 

Location: University of Bordeaux, Pessac.

Contract duration: 15 months.

Preferred start date: 01/03/2026.

Mission overview :

The recruited person will focus on insurance and land arrangements in residential areas at risk.
The evolution of the climate is accompanied by an increase in claims and questions the evolution of our insurance system in these territories. If the increase in the natural disaster surcharge on January 1, 2025 (from 12% to 20%) allows for correcting the imbalance of the natural disaster compensation scheme in the short term, its resistance to climate change in the medium term requires working on other levers.
In a preventive logic, it would thus be advisable to encourage the adoption of individual protective behaviours, which the CatNat mechanism is struggling to induce (in the case of risks covered by CatNat).
This study is part of this perspective, and more particularly targets what concerns incentives to change individual behaviors.

The postdoctoral research will be able to address the following tasks and target those that will be addressed as a priority:

• Modeling of individual housing decisions.
• Design of a hybrid incentive between public solidarity and private financial insurance.

The specific study topics may evolve according to the skills of the post-doctoral student. e selected. and developments of research already underway. They a priori include the following elements:

• Risk preferences [Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics].
• Moral hazard (the risk associated with the implementation of a public collective insurance (CatNat) does not encourage avoiding risky localization) [Theory of Incentives].
• Residential location choices and real estate/land market [Urban economy].

Profile sought :

Holder of a PhD in in Economics, you have proven knowledge of theoretical modelling, incentive theory and decision theory under uncertainty, moral hazard and anti-selection as well as empirical studies, preference evaluation, choice experiments, discrete choice simulations.

Supervision :

You will work under the supervision of Mrs. Cécile AUBERT, Professor in economics Univ. Bordeaux – BxSE and Mrs. Jeanne DACHARY BERNARD Researcher in environmental economics, microeconomics and land economics INRAe – UR ETTIS.

Detailed job offer in english here and application before January 4 here.

Location: University of Bordeaux, Pessac.

Contract duration: 15 months.

Preferred start date: 01/03/2026.

Mission overview :

The recruited person will focus on insurance and land arrangements in residential areas at risk.
The evolution of the climate is accompanied by an increase in claims and questions the evolution of our insurance system in these territories. If the increase in the natural disaster surcharge on January 1, 2025 (from 12% to 20%) allows for correcting the imbalance of the natural disaster compensation scheme in the short term, its resistance to climate change in the medium term requires working on other levers.
In a preventive logic, it would thus be advisable to encourage the adoption of individual protective behaviours, which the CatNat mechanism is struggling to induce (in the case of risks covered by CatNat).
This study is part of this perspective, and more particularly targets what concerns incentives to change individual behaviors.

The postdoctoral research will be able to address the following tasks and target those that will be addressed as a priority:

• Modeling of individual housing decisions.
• Design of a hybrid incentive between public solidarity and private financial insurance.

The specific study topics may evolve according to the skills of the post-doctoral student. e selected. and developments of research already underway. They a priori include the following elements:

• Risk preferences [Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics].
• Moral hazard (the risk associated with the implementation of a public collective insurance (CatNat) does not encourage avoiding risky localization) [Theory of Incentives].
• Residential location choices and real estate/land market [Urban economy].

Profile sought :

Holder of a PhD in in Economics, you have proven knowledge of theoretical modelling, incentive theory and decision theory under uncertainty, moral hazard and anti-selection as well as empirical studies, preference evaluation, choice experiments, discrete choice simulations.

Supervision :

You will work under the supervision of Mrs. Cécile AUBERT, Professor in economics Univ. Bordeaux – BxSE and Mrs. Jeanne DACHARY BERNARD Researcher in environmental economics, microeconomics and land economics INRAe – UR ETTIS.

Detailed job offer in english here and application before January 4 here.

Location: University of Bordeaux, Pessac.

Contract duration: 15 months.

Preferred start date: 01/03/2026.

Mission overview :

The recruited person will focus on insurance and land arrangements in residential areas at risk.
The evolution of the climate is accompanied by an increase in claims and questions the evolution of our insurance system in these territories. If the increase in the natural disaster surcharge on January 1, 2025 (from 12% to 20%) allows for correcting the imbalance of the natural disaster compensation scheme in the short term, its resistance to climate change in the medium term requires working on other levers.
In a preventive logic, it would thus be advisable to encourage the adoption of individual protective behaviours, which the CatNat mechanism is struggling to induce (in the case of risks covered by CatNat).
This study is part of this perspective, and more particularly targets what concerns incentives to change individual behaviors.

The postdoctoral research will be able to address the following tasks and target those that will be addressed as a priority:

• Modeling of individual housing decisions.
• Design of a hybrid incentive between public solidarity and private financial insurance.

The specific study topics may evolve according to the skills of the post-doctoral student. e selected. and developments of research already underway. They a priori include the following elements:

• Risk preferences [Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics].
• Moral hazard (the risk associated with the implementation of a public collective insurance (CatNat) does not encourage avoiding risky localization) [Theory of Incentives].
• Residential location choices and real estate/land market [Urban economy].

Profile sought :

Holder of a PhD in in Economics, you have proven knowledge of theoretical modelling, incentive theory and decision theory under uncertainty, moral hazard and anti-selection as well as empirical studies, preference evaluation, choice experiments, discrete choice simulations.

Supervision :

You will work under the supervision of Mrs. Cécile AUBERT, Professor in economics Univ. Bordeaux – BxSE and Mrs. Jeanne DACHARY BERNARD Researcher in environmental economics, microeconomics and land economics INRAe – UR ETTIS.

Detailed job offer in english here and application before January 4 here.